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Abstract
This paper investigates the key drivers and key inhibitors from an Information System (IS)
Security and Business Continuity Management (BCM) perspective. The research was
conducted using a forum with personnel from nine government agencies with follow-up
interviews with personnel from a further sixteen agencies. The study identifies key issues
across a broad cross-section of government organisations. These key issues include
awareness and active management support, training and appropriate funding. The issues
identified are useful to management when implementing IS Security and undertaking
Business Continuity Planning over e-government within agencies.

1.

Introduction

Prior to e-Government, records and information were mainly stored on paper in files,
filing cabinets, and vaults. Paper documents have a degree of separation between the
client and the flow, storage and retrieval of documents. Manual records management
systems and processes, established procedures to process and transfer documents through
the system. These documents could be tracked transparently through the organisation.
Hence, if tampered with, the changes would be clearly evident. These paper documents
were subject to a level of security considered to be acceptable at that time. The security
measures required to protect them focused mainly on the physical protection of the
document and restricting permissions for people to access the records. While these
1
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documents could be copied, the paper type, the colour and the size would be difficult to
match with or replace the original. Also, copying documents is traditionally a relatively
slow process.
Security threats and protective measures for these paper based systems were identified
and resolved. They were written into polices and procedures, and updated over many
years. This provided a degree of security for documents completely different to that of
Intranet or Internet based systems which have the capability to immediately download
information, giving the client (end user) the ability to copy and re-transmit this
information in nanoseconds. This vulnerability exists for any organisation, whether
private or public, that has a web presence (Straub et al., 1998: Backhouse et al., 2001).
Information system security has previously concentrated on confidentiality of documents
stored electronically (Spinellis et al., 1999). In terms of the public perception of
government organisations, security means the protection of records and data that are held
for the purpose of recording, administering and monitoring the actions and policies of
government agencies. This applies equally to paper documents and the data held on
computer databases (Kiel, 2003). The rapid growth in the volume of information stored
electronically and the uptake of e-commerce within government has heightened the need
for increased security to protect the privacy of this information and prevent fraudulent
activities (Bradford, 1999).
Electronic information is extremely portable and also very easy to modify. The
administration, business and legal processes associated with security and protection of
electronic government information have not been fully developed (Scott, 2003; Kraemer
et al., 2000; Teo et al., 2003). Consequently government projects are endeavouring to
develop policies and procedures to improve security (Frank, 2003). From the public’s
perspective, government is seen as one entity; hence a security problem within one
agency may be viewed as a failure of the whole of government process. Therefore the
process of maintaining and improving information security across all government
agencies is viewed as an essential project. The research discussed in this paper forms part
of a longitudinal action research study to help inform and improve information security
across government. This paper reports on an initial research study, which involved a
forum for and follow-up interviews of key agencies to determine the key drivers and
inhibitors for information system security and business continuity planning (BCP) within
and across government.
The ISO Standard AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 Information technology — Code of
practice for information security management contains twelve major sections which deal
with information security issues. One section, Section 11, deals with Business Continuity
Management (as a component of the information security issue ‘availability’ of
information). As the agencies are required to achieve compliance with this standard, the
forum questions were grouped around the eleven Information Security and one Business
Continuity Management which incorporates Business Continuity Planning (BCP) sections
of the standard. [It should be noted that Business Continuity Management (BCM)
incorporates Business Continuity Planning, and BCP in an information technology
environment is also often referred to as Disaster Recovery Planning (DRP)].
The focus of AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 is to protect security of information by
providing a set of recommendations (in effect controls and best practices) for situations
that are applicable for E-commerce and also E-government. With the increasing volume
of business being conducted between organisations over electronic networks it is essential
that a trusted relationship be established between the stakeholders trading together. One
such scheme is for all parties to agree on an appropriate standard and adopt it, adhere to
its principles and move to accreditation [The standard in this case is
AS/NZS7799.2.2003].
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A number of frameworks have been developed and tested since the 1970s to quantify and
manage the issue of information system security. Australia’s standard for Information
Security Management (AS/NZS7799: 2000) and the second part Information security
management Part 2: Specification for information security management systems
(AS/NZS7799.2.2003), provide a framework and set of recommendations in a risk
management context.
The second part of the Australian Standard, AS/NZS7799.2.2003, is an adoption of the
British standard BS 7799.2:2002 Information security management systems, Part 2:
Specification with guidance for use.
The first part, AS/NZS7799: 2000, has been revised for application to e-Commerce, and
was re-branded from its original publication as AS/NZS 4444: 1996. The current
standard (first part) for Information System Management is Information technology—
Code of practice for information security management - AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001
with an amendment in 2004, redesignated from AS/NZS7799: 2000 The latest version is
acknowledged as a generic guide for the establishment and implementation of a process
such as information system security management and information system risk
management.
Certification is possible for ‘7799’ and is recognised internationally (under ISO 17799).
There are, however, very few organisations that can offer this service, currently only two
within Australia. The adoption of standards is becoming increasingly important to
establish benchmarks and assurance for organisations and clients that conduct business
on-line. An additional benefit of certification to this standard is its regular (6 monthly)
audit reviews which ensure certification to the standard is maintained, thus providing
extra rigor and assurance regarding security compliance.
From a global perspective, all Government priorities are generally to fulfil the following
objectives:
•

Improving service delivery - to tangibly improve service delivery and satisfy the
highest service priorities of people, businesses, communities and employees by
redirecting resources to priority services.

•

Getting value for money from the public purse - Government expects agencies to
operate within their budgets, rigorously pursue efficiencies, streamline regulatory
systems and cut “red tape”.

•

Aligning supporting government agendas - Government wants to ensure that public
sector planning, investment and management strategies align with its goals and that
agencies work together to achieve the Government’s priorities (OICT, 2004).

These objectives are used to drive the delivery of several services through different
delivery channels and are made available to ensure that they function for people,
businesses, communities and employees. Agencies and clusters take a systematic
approach to obtaining regular feedback from users to be better informed about people’s
needs and expectations. Regularly refreshing this knowledge and using it in tandem with
other research is a prerequisite for identifying Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) based service delivery solutions.
1.1

Definitions of IS Security and BCP

IS Security (ISS) is effective implementation of policies to ensure the confidentiality,
availability and integrity of information and assets is protected from theft, tampering,
manipulation or corruption. BCP (which is incorporated in BCM) is planning to mitigate
3
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the adverse effects of an unexpected catastrophe, which may result in the loss of services,
operations or information for a period of time. Some explanation of these terms is
provided below.
“Information systems security is the protection of information systems against
unauthorized access to or modification of information whether in storage, processing, or
transit, and against denial of service to authorized users, including those measures
necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats” (NSTISSC, 1999, p4).
Business Continuity Management (BCM) is defined as a “holistic management process
that identifies potential impacts that threaten an organisation and provides a framework
for building resilience and the capability for an effective response that safeguards the
interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, band and value creating activities (Business
Continuity Institute & BSI Standard PAS 56)” (Worthington, 2005).
The term Business Continuity Planning (BCP) is defined by Gartner as:
•

“Planning for the continuation of business operations in the event of a disaster

•

Ensure that critical business activities are maintained or restored as quickly as
possible

•

Focused on a prioritized resumption of the most critical business functions”
(Gartner, 2002 p9)

IS Security has previously concentrated on confidentiality of information stored
electronically. The rapid growth in the volume of such information and the uptake of eCommerce within organisations has heightened the need for increased security to protect
the privacy of this information and prevent fraudulent activities (Spinellis, 1999).
The objective of information security is to preserve an organisation’s information assets
and the business processes they support in the context of (Bell, 2001):
•

Confidentiality - ensuring that information is only available to the people and
systems authorised to receive it. Information may be confidential for many reasons
including privacy, commercial or political;

•

Integrity - ensuring that information is only changed by people and systems
authorised to make changes to it; and

•

Availability - ensuring that information and information processing systems are
available when information is required (Evans, 2003).

These objectives originate from and are consistent with OECD publications dating back
to the early 1990’s and also the subsequent (and current) ISO/IEC, BS, Australian
information and other international security standards, guidelines and handbooks.
At any time an organisation can experience a disruption to its business operations beyond
its control. It may be a major incident with lasting effects such as a flood or fire or may
be shorter in duration due to an event such as a power failure or denial of access to
critical offices or systems.
An organisation can limit the impact of such events through contingency planning
including the development of a BCP. A BCP is a critical component of IT security in
general and information security management systems (ISMS) in particular.
A BCP includes the process of planning to create a state of readiness which will provide
an immediate response to a disaster affecting a business unit or the IT environment of an
agency. A Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) consists of documented procedures for the
4
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management and recovery of the critical IT services of an agency should an unscheduled
disruption occur. It allows for orderly and timely recovery of the IT processing
capabilities. For the purposes of this paper, BCP encompasses DRP and both are
components of BCM.
Increasing complexity and dependency on IT by government agencies, the prevalence of
computer hackers, terrorist threats and the introduction of legislation relating to
protection of Government records has raised the importance of IT Security and
Information System Security Management for the Government and its agencies. Although
the AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 standard primarily refers to information and systems
security (ISS) it includes BCM and the related BCP as an important section. This means
that adequate BCM and BCP provisions must be in place to enable the agencies to
recover from any type of disaster that affects continuity of core government business.

2.

Research Methods

A forum was conducted on the 4th April 2003 at the Office of Information Technology,
to determine the key drivers and key inhibitors to Information System Security and
Business Continuity Management (incorporating BCM and BCP). At the end of the
forum, a disaster scenario formed the basis of a roundtable discussion. Eleven
representatives from nine government agencies, with both technical and management
backgrounds, attended the forum. The agencies ranged in size from small agencies (<
350 staff for example Arts and Ports), through medium sized agencies (350-1000 staff,
such as Agriculture and Justice), to large agencies (over 1000 staff members, for example
Commerce and Health). These agencies included health, justice, education, Of these
agencies, one had achieved certification to the AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 standard,
one had not yet started their certification process and the others were in the process of
achieving certification.
The process whereby the research forum involved a focus group is one the most common
methods of qualitative research (Blaikie, 2000; Ross, 2004). A Delphi rating technique
was also used to rank and rate issues raised in the forum. Schmidt et al. (2001) used this
technique during their research to identify software project risks. It was determined to be
a useful way to rank issues that were identified during a brainstorming session. Forum
attendees consisted of nine IS Security Managers who were involved in a series of
question-focused, scenario-based activities guided by a facilitator. The advantage of this
group discussion forum method is that it enabled participates to firstly brainstorm ideas,
and then discuss the ideas prior to rating and ranking the issues disclosed. The forum
created an atmosphere that allowed for open interaction and stimulating discussion, and
provided a flexible environment in which to discover the perceptions and experiences of
the individual participants. The forum also uncovered concepts and generated new ideas
on the topics being discussed.
The original drivers and inhibitors were taken from suggestions by each participant. Each
participant was asked to prepare at least one driver and one inhibitor for both ISS and
BCP. In an exchange of ideas around the table each participant proposed ideas which
were documented on a whiteboard and the process was repeated until all participants’
ideas had been documented. The completed list was discussed, duplicates eliminated,
then ranked and rated, and the process and was then repeated for inhibitors and again for
BCP.
The focus of the forum and follow-up interviews was to determine the key drivers and
key inhibitors of IS Security and BCM (incorporating BCP) from a whole of government
perspective. This research project is essential for government as it highlights a range of
difficulties faced by agencies when charged with the responsibility to improve/implement
5
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their ISS and BCP processes. The forum identified and allowed the discussion of
initiatives developed within the individual agencies that should be of benefit across
government and improve information security.
The research questions addressed by this study include:
1.

What do you see as the key drivers for successful IS Security for your agency?

2.

What do you see as the key inhibitors to successful IS Security for your agency?

3.

What do you see as the key drivers for BCP to work in your agency?

4.

What do you see as the key inhibitors to successful BCP for your agency?

The issues raised in the forum were scaled by their rank and ratings:
•

Rank – ranking order of preference (1,2,3…n). This task required the participant to
order the issues from the most important (numbered ‘1’) to the lease important issue
in the sequence. The analysis involved sorting the ranking issued from the most to
least important.

•

Rating – involved estimating the magnitude of importance of each issue. This task
required the participant to estimate the degree of importance of the individual issue.
The scale used was a Likert Scale ranging from ‘7’ being the most important to ‘1’
being very unimportant. The analysis involved averaging the ratings across all the
participants the sorting them in reverse order from the most to least important, thus
the issue with an average closest to ‘7’ was then rated the most important issue.

The follow-up interview questions were based on the outcomes of the forum and the
agencies were selected from all agencies within government and stratified into one of
three groups:
•

Agencies with established policies, procedures and practices sufficient enough to
achieve certification to AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 within the next few months.

•

Agencies with developing policies, procedures but are not prepared enough for
certification within the next 12 months.

•

Agencies who made limited progress towards certification and would be unlikely to
achieve certification.

An additional 16 agencies were interviewed using the questions developed from the
forum. The results from these questions will be discussed in the following sections.

3.

Information System Security

3.1

Key Drivers for Successful IS Security

The first focus question discussed at the forum related to identifying key drivers for IS
Security. The participants identified the key drivers, which are set out in Table 1. These
are the major factors which should contribute to successful IS Security processes within
government agencies (Baird et al, 2002).
Table 1 shows the average rankings of these key drivers and the average importance
ratings given by the participants to each driver.
6

Key Factors in E-Government Information System Security

Table 1: Key Drivers For Successful IS Security
Key Drivers For Successful IS Security

Ranked
Average
Average
Importance
1
3
Rank
Rating
2
Rating

Active support of senior management

1

1

6.6

Commitment of funding

2

2

6.2

Protection of information assets

3

3

6.1

Statutory / legislative requirements

4

7

5.6

Staff awareness & training

5

5

5.7

Maintain integrity of electronic records

6

4

5.7

Negative experience(s) can drive change

7

11

5.0

Compliance with standards e.g. AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001

8

8

5.3

The issues transcribed from the forum are an accurate summary of the discussion that
took place. All issues were rated above 4.3 (> moderately important) indicating that all of
these issues are worth considering by management as factors that drive successful ISS
processes within e-government. In order to differentiate between issues, ranking was
carried out which revealed the three major issues (refer to Table 1) that are key to
successful IS Security processes. These are:
•

the active support of management

•

sufficient funding

•

staff awareness and training.

Comments from the participants emphasise these issues. The important elements of the
comments raised in the forum on the need for Senior Management Support include:
“… supported by senior management … the resources are given to you and it’s
an achievable outcome …” (Participant 10)
The ‘active support of management’ was ranked the most important issue and rated
number 1 in priority. The need for Management support is essential and necessary as it is
senior management that is ultimately accountable and charged with the task of initiating
and supporting important projects with adequate funding and resources. The ranking of
this issue so highly in this forum indicates that, although IS security concerns have been
recognised by the IT department for many years, senior management has yet to fully
appreciated the importance of IS Security processes within the business framework. The
failure of senior management to fully support IS security processes is limited by the
expectation of the outcome measured against the performance of other projects within the
organisation. It may be difficult for management to approve ongoing funding for IS
security projects that are not understood or appreciated as being a necessity (that is, of
high risk), nor as generating profit or reducing costs.

1 Rank (of the order assigned by each participant, averaged, then ordered).
2 Rating [of the importance ranking (1-7 for each issue raised). This is the sum of this data, in ascending
order of the average).
3 Average Rating (The sum of the average ratings across all participants in descending order of the average).
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“… the reason management support is lacking in many projects is the poor
explanation of the issues and benefits middle management provide to senior
management …” (follow up interview)
“… most business cases for security upgrades are poorly structured and written
and do not clearly explain the benefits of security and the tasks to be carried out
…” (follow up interview)
Following on from the issue of Senior Management Support is the ‘Statutory/Legal
requirements’ which not only affect the integrity of the business but may place legal
obligations on a Director/CEO and other senior managers of an organisation.
“… (the) main driver is reducing our agency exposure, whether it’s our losses,
legal liability, downtime or service loss …” (Participant 1)
This issue of reducing agency exposure has major implications across the whole of an
organisation as the exposures may lead to a loss of confidential information, a loss of
reputation and/or financial losses. This in turn may result in systems having to be
temporarily removed from public access until solution patches are applied or law
enforcement services investigate any alleged security breaches. If service level
agreements have been established a loss of service may result in contractual penalties or
legal action.
Another major issue identified is the issue of ‘Awareness and Training’.
“… Staff awareness and training, … people need to know what is expected of
them and they (need) to know the basis of the issues of security so they know what
they have to contend with and what is expected of them… we need to make them
aware and do what’s necessary so that we all know where we stand … ”
(Participant 9)
With regular changes in the workforce it is difficult to maintain a functional pool of
knowledge regarding the safe and effective operation of business systems. As new staff
commence their duties most of the knowledge conveyed by colleagues is about the
operational processes rather than concentrating on the security components of the
business processes. Until a staff member has been through orientation and received the
necessary security training, the risk of unsafe business processes is increased. When staff
are fully trained, it is crucial that they are aware of the responsibilities and
accountabilities of their role.
3.2

Key Inhibitors to Successful IS Security Processes

The second focus question discussed related to identifying key inhibitors to successful IS
Security processes. The participants identified the following key inhibitors, which are set
out in Table 2. These are the major factors which would inhibit successful IS Security
processes within government agencies.
Table 2 shows the average rankings of these key inhibitors and the average importance
ratings given by the participants to each inhibitor.
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Table 2: Key Inhibitors to Successful IS Security Processes
Rating

Av.
Rating

1

1

6.7

Lack of security awareness and training for all staff

2

3

6.0

Lack of allocated funds due to low priority

3

4

5.9

No negative experiences so it is assumed that everything is ok

4

8

5.4

Resistance to set up a uniform user interface across the organisation

5

2

6.2

Lack of consistency of risk management processes across the
breadth of organization

6

5

5.7

Expectation of users to be able to access all information when they
want.

7

17

4.7

Security perceived as hindering productivity

8

6

5.7

Key Inhibitors to Successful IS Security Processes

Rank
Security needs to part of the development process
Lack of management awareness

Once again all inhibitors raised rated above 4.6 (> moderately important) and hence all
should be considered, as key factors that may inhibit successful IS security processes
within government agencies. The major issue identified as an inhibitor is the issue of
‘Management Awareness’. This issue scored the highest in ‘Rating’ and was also
‘Ranked’ the most important.
“Lack of awareness that information generated belongs to the organisation … ”
(Participant 4)
The awareness of information as an important resource not only needs to be recognised
by staff but also by senior management. The collection and processing of any
information collected by an organisation will inturn be subsequently used by them or
other organisations to make decisions about their customers and services. These
decisions can be business, financial, personal and may even have life threatening
consequences. The protection of this information from fraudulent or accidental tampering
or loss is vital and is clearly a responsibility of management.
“… the perception or assumption with security is that it is solely an IT responsibly rather
than recognising that it affects the whole business …” (Participant 6)
This quote reinforces the previous comments where management needs to be aware of the
significance of the relationship between business processes and the IT departments in
terms of responsibility for information security. Just because the IT department
develops/operates the business systems, the information contained within belongs to the
organisation. Therefore, security of business information cannot be solely to the
responsibility of the IT department.
“… IS security is a necessary evil which hindered productivity …” (Participant 1)
This comment is one of the most common complaints levelled at IT security processes
from the operational areas. It is probably also true, effective security has to be protective
and therefore intrusive to some degree to offer an appropriate level of protection. One of
9
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the aims of a security system designer is to try to make security as easy and practical as
possible to implement and use, even though the back end development systems can be
quite complex.
“… Different size agencies have different needs…” (follow up interview)
The policies developed by central government tend to place all agencies in the same
category and fail to recognise the variation in size, function and critically of agencies.
The initiatives of central agency policy should account for the variations in agencies
trying to comply with their directives.

4.

4.1

Business Continuity Planning (BCP)

Key Drivers Business Continuity Planning (BCP)

The third focus question discussed at the forum relate to identifying key drivers for BCP.
The participants identified the following key drivers, which are set out in Table 3. These
are the major factors, which should contribute to successful BCP processes within
government agencies.
Table 3 shows the average rankings of these key drivers and the average importance
ratings given by the participants to each driver.
Table 3: Key Drivers for BCP Processes to Work in Your Agency
Key Drivers for BCP Processes To Work In Your Agency

Rank

Rating

Av.
Rating

Recognise that business is the driver not information technology

1

1

6.9

Standards and legislation for vital records may be enforceable

2

5

5.9

Use experienced external consultants to improve skilling of staff

3

3

6.1

Previous negative experience

4

4

6.0

Assigning appropriate levels of authority

5

2

6.2

Integration of organisational and community needs if applicable

7

6

5.8

To protect critical information

6

9

5.3

BCP processes to encompass the “whole” organisation (planning
phase for response and recovery)

8

7

5.8

All factors raised were rated above 4.7 ( > moderately important) indicating that all of
these issues are worth considering by management as factors that drive successful BCP
processes within e-government. Once again the ranking in the table differentiates
between the issues. The most common issue on BCP Process Drivers was based on the
following comment:
“ … That the business is the driver of BCP and not IT driving that …” (Participant 9)
Businesses need to be fully attentive of the union between the business and the BCP
processes. This means that the business should not isolate itself from being a stakeholder
in the BCP processes and allow the IT department to lead the BCP processes. Although
10
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the development of a BCP is usually charged to the IT department, it will become an IT
Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) unless business and management are serious about having
an active role in its development, testing and review.
“…. when you read 7799 (AS/NZS7799) it clearly says that BCP is an integral
component of gaining that certification …” (Participant 3)
Essentially an effective level of security includes an effective and tested BCP.
“…. it not an imaginary concept, it is a real and pragmatic approach to managing their
business in a day-to-day environment …” (Participant 4)
BCP is not a document that is quickly assembled, with a report to management that the
task of BCP is now completed. BCP is dynamic and involves the active participation of
the entire organisation. It is more about the culture of the process to create an effective
process rather than just a document. It also requires continual updates, testing and, as
such is a ‘living’ document.
4.2

Key Inhibitors to Successful Business Continuity Processes

The last focus question that was discussed relates to identifying key inhibitors to BCP
Processes. The participants identified the following key inhibitors, which are set out in
Table 4. These are the major factors, which may contribute to inhibiting successful to
BCP processes within government agencies.
Table 4 shows the average rankings of these key inhibitors and the average importance
ratings given by the participants to each inhibitor.
Table 4: Key Inhibitors to Successful BCP Processes
Rank

Rating

Av.
Rating

Lack of awareness

1

1

6.7

Failure to recognise that the business is the driver not information
technology

2

2

6.3

Failure to understand where IT fits into the business model

3

3

6.1

Lack of allocated and availability of funds for clearly identifiable
business plans

4

4

5.9

Training at all levels to increase awareness

5

5

5.9

Key Inhibitors to Successful BCP Processes

Lack of capacity / resources to test BCP

6

6

5.9

Lack of current and appropriate BCP processes

7

8

5.6

Incomplete ‘asset register’ & other information that ‘hooks’ into the plan

8

10

5.6

All BCP inhibitors raised rated above 4.8 (> moderately important) and hence all should
be considered as key factors that may inhibit successful BCP processes within
government agencies. Once again the awareness issue has been raised as one of the key
inhibitors for BCP processes within agencies. In this research question, “Awareness” was
both rated and ranked as number 1.
11
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“…. lack of awareness of the need at an executive level because of the perception of no
real risk ….” (Participant 1)
Some risk managers would rate the chance of a catastrophic event occurring to an
organisation, requiring the implementation of their BCP, as once in a lifetime. This
however, does not absolve management of the responsibility of preparing a BCP to deal
with a catastrophic event occurring.
“…. lack of capacity to test 24/7 …” (Participant 3)
There can be a lack of resources or capacity within the business or IT systems to fully test
an organisation’s BCP processes. Some business systems cannot be shut down or
switched off-line to be tested because they are mission critical or sometimes have
potentially life threatening consequences. It then becomes a management decision to
determine the appropriate BCP testing strategy based upon the associated risks of the
organisation.
“… you can have a plan that covers every aspect of your business …” (Participant 6)
This comment may be a little optimistic, but in the event of a disaster, which requires the
implementation of the BCP processes, all major aspects of the business need to be
addressed by the plan. This is usually determined by an appropriate business impact
analysis (BIA) being undertaken.
“… using a BCP video in induction training …" 200 eyes looking at security is better
than 2 IT eyes….” (follow up interview)
This comment highlights the issues of staff awareness and staff induction being a good
start point for this initiative. However, BCP processes are usually not the only issue
discussed at induction. Other strategies need to be implemented to ensure BCP processes
have a high profile within the agency.

5.

Discussion and Limitations

There is a very good correlation between the ‘ranked’ order and the ‘rating’ order of the
top 5 issues raised at the forum. The correlation can be seen in the connectivity (arrows)
between the ranking and rating columns of Tables 1 to 4. This further reaffirms the
importance of the issues raised and the reliability of the individual measures of the
ranking and rating.
One major limitation of the initial study is that it only focused on the practices of nine
government agencies. However, the additional sixteen agencies that participated in the
follow-up interviews give a more representative result as these agencies were stratified in
terms of progress towards AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 certification rather than
grouping by agency staff numbers. Also, it should be noted that only high-level issues
were covered and while these issues were significant, the purpose was to identify them.
Exploring these issues in greater detail and linking them to agency certifications remains
an area for future research.

12
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Other issues for further consideration are that there is no overall corporate governance for
the whole of Government. Also, each agency has the autonomy to set their individual
processes and to achieve certification to AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001.

6.

Conclusion and Future Directions

The purpose of this paper was to determine the key issues that exist with IS Security and
BCP processes for Whole of Government and then rank and rate them accordingly. The
summary of the main issues across the four focus questions of the forum and follow-up
interviews includes the majority of the four following issues:
1.

Training

2.

Management Support

3.

Budget / Cost / Resources

4.

Awareness

While not all of these overall issues are applicable to all organisation or agencies, they
would appear to be relevant to a large number of organisations as key drivers or key
inhibitors in respect of IS Security and BCP processes.
The positive effects from successful IS Security and BCP programs in organisations
should result in the ability to obtain and maintain the support and understanding of
Management.
The forum results reinforce the requirement that BCP processes should be an integral part
of the business plans of every organisation, and not an IT ‘add on’. Even though IT is
often the champion and custodian of the BCP process, this does not imply that the IT
department is the driving force behind its development, maintenance and ongoing testing
nor is the IT Department solely responsible and accountable for these processes.
This study highlights the perception of IS Security and BCP issues within government
organisations. The second phase of this e-government research program was to expand
the coverage of the forum, by interviewing more government agencies, using the same set
of four research questions and allowing them to rate and rank the issues raised by this
forum. The next phase of this research program is to expand the coverage of the forum
and interview government agencies and organisations, that are also attempting to achieve
certification to AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 and determine the key drivers and
inhibitors with agencies certified to AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001.
In conclusion, running the same exercise with non-government agencies that are also
attempting to achieve certification to AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 would be beneficial
as a comparative study and should be of practical assistance to private sector
organisations.
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